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STATUTORY REORGANIZATION

3

LUTHER

D. SWANSTROM'

HE practitioner called upon to direct the reorganization of
unwieldy capitalization or of debt structures that have become too burdensome by reason of reduced income of the debtor's business or from any other cause, must often resort to
court action to consummate a satisfactory reorganization. If the
only practical and efficient forum for reorganization is a bankruptcy court, may the debtor be changed from an individual to
a corporation, or vice versa, in order to obtain the relief required? Is the completion of a satisfactory reorganization so important to the private and public interests involved that a corporation organized as a step in the reorganization process, or one
organized for the purpose of being reorganized, may be brought
into the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court for reorganization?
Two circuits have had under consideration the question of the
amenability of newly formed corporations to Section 77B. The
eighth circuit has held that such a corporation is not amenable.
The seventh circuit has approved the petitions of two such debtors.' From the rationale of the decisions in the two circuits a
conflict may be said to exist, though the approval of the petition
rests in the sound discretion of the court.
The cases in the seventh circuit proceeded upon the theory that
it was the duty of a court of equity to afford relief upon a proper
1 Member of Illinois Bar, and of firm of Johnson, Swanstrom & Wiles; author,
Chapter X-Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Statute (Foundation
Press, Chicago, 1938).
2 Milwaukee Postal Bldg. Corp. v. McCann, 95 F. (2d) 948 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938).
3 In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81 F.(2d) 981 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936); In re Loeb
Apartments, 89 F.(2d) 461 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
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petition where needed, and that the statute granted such power
to the court. The eighth circuit, in the Milwaukee Postal Building
Corporation case (cited above), denied the relief on the ground
of legal fraud.
The question has not been directly passed upon in other circuits. Petitions of corporations organized for the purpose of filing
petitions under Section 77B have been approved in the second and
in the seventh circuits without any point, apparently, having
been raised on the question. 4
It is proposed to examine in order the cases sustaining and denying amenability, and those not directly in point but cited in
support of amenability; then will be considered the theories of
the principal cases in the light of the purposes of the statute. It
may be said at the outset that the conclusion reached is in favor
of amenability.
CASES SUSTAINING AMENABILITY

In the Knickerbocker case 5 the corporate debtor seeking reorganization under Section 77B filed its petition immediately
after creation and the receipt of a conveyance of the hotel property involved from an individual nominee of the bondholders'
committee, who had become the purchaser of the property at a
foreclosure sale more than two years previously. Ninety-eight
per cent of the first mortgage bonds were deposited with a committee that was the moving spirit behind the reorganization proceedings. Reorganization in the state court in connection with
foreclosure proceedings had failed because the state court had
refused to approve a plan and to confirm the sale made pursuant
thereto, had removed the receiver for breach of duty, and had
restrained all parties from taking steps for reorganization in the
bankruptcy courts. The 77B petition was approved over the objection of 2 per cent of the bondholders.
The court stressed the point that the indebtedness was not that
4 In re Nine North Church Street, 82 F. (2d) 186 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936): "To forestall
this [a suit by the trustee on demand of certificate holders against Maryland
Casualty Company on its guaranty], Maryland organized the Nine North Church
Street Corporation, the debtor, and transferred the property to it, subject to the
mortgage. One week later, this petition under Bankruptcy Act § 77B . . . was
ified." In re Louis Joliet Garage Corp., 100 F.(2d) 751 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938): "The
corporation was organized and on the following day, January 26, 1938, a voluntary
petition was filed by the newly organized corporation for relief under section 77B."
5 In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81 F.(2d) 981 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936); before Evans,
Sparks, and Briggle: opinion by Briggle, D.J.
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of an individual, capable of filing under Section 74, but that of a
corporation; that the fact that an individual was holding the
naked legal title to the property for use of the bondholders did
not brand it as individual property; that the same property was
being dealt with, the same indebtedness and the same bondholders and the same "receivership spectre that produced thousands
for the receiver but not one cent for the actual owners." The
court stated that if the debtor had been organized merely for the
purpose of incurring debts in order to file a 77B petition without
anything further, good faith would have been lacking, and that
would have brought an end to the proceeding. The opinion referred to the practice of a court of equity to look through the
form to the substance, and having done so the court saw "a bewildered group of bondholders confronted with a condition and
not a theory .... They had honestly, we believe, taken various
steps to bring about a fair adjustment of the unfortunate situation
and had been thwarted in their purpose. Ninety-eight per cent of
them still had faith that a court of equity somewhere, somehow,
would deliver them from bondage." The court held that the intent
of Section 77B was to prevent a minority group from defeating a
worthy plan of the majority and thus develop a nuisance value
for their claims; that the statute contemplated a plan of reorganization; that the statute did not limit its application to corporations in existence at the time of its passage, and that the failure to exclude subsequently organized corporations was in keeping with its general purpose. The court distinguished the North
Kenmore Building Corporation case' on the facts.
6 In re North Kenmore Bldg. Corp., 81 F.(2d) 656 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936); before
Sparks, Alschuler, and Briggle; opinion by Briggle, D.J. In this case an individual
owned land, buildings, and furnishings appraised at $192,203, with first mortgage
bonds aggregating $259,000 and a second mortgage of $85,000 with accrued interest.
A decree of foreclosure and sale was had in the state court on June 10, 1935,
pursuant to a bill filed on June 16, 1932. On March 7, 1933, the owner quitclaimed
the property to his attorney, who did not assume the indebtedness. On July 2,
1935, the debtor was incorporated and its stock issued to the attorney. On July 3,
1935, the attorney conveyed the property to the debtor corporation, which assumed
all the liens, aggregating $344,000. On July 18, 1935, the debtor filed a petition
under Section 77B, which was attacked by a bondholders' committee holding in
excess of 82 per cent of the outstanding bonds, on the ground of lack of good faith.
The court, dismissing the petition for lack of good faith, stated that the objection of a large percentage of bondholders to the petition weighed heavily in the
determination of the question of good faith.
Thereupon the opinion proceeds with a further argument as to the lack of good
faith, in that Section 74 had been enacted to apply to individuals and 77B to
corporations, and hence individuals might not clothe themselves "in corporate
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In the Loeb Apartment case' a petition under Section 74, filed
by Loeb, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Loeb thereupon
formed the debtor corporation and conveyed his property to it
and caused the debtor to file a petition under Section 77B within
a month of its incorporation. The debtor's plan was accepted by
holders of more than 66% per cent of the first mortgage bonds.
The special master recommended the disapproval of the petition, but Judge Wilkerson, D.J., filed a memorandum overruling the master's recommendation. Two days later, however, the
Kenmore Building Corporation decision was handed down and
this decision induced Judge Wilkerson to reverse his conclusion.
One side therefore relied upon the Kenmore decision and the other on the Knickerbocker decision.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question is one of
good faith, or the lack thereof, and finding that the petition was
filed in good faith, ordered that it be approved. If, in the opinion
of the court, the proceeding is an attempt unreasonably to delay
and harass creditors, good faith would be lacking:
No one evidentiary fact can ordinarily be given paramount weight in
deciding the question. If it is obvious that a debtor is attempting unreasonably to deter and harass creditors in their bona fide efforts to realize
upon their securities, good faith does not exist. But if it is apparent that
the purpose is not to delay or defeat creditors but rather to put an end
to long delays, administrative expenses, statutory periods of redemption
and unreasonable obstruction by minorities, incident too frequently, we
are sorry to observe, to mortgage foreclosure, and to invoke the operation of the act in the spirit indicated by Congress in the legislation,
namely, to attempt to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization, upon a
feasible basis, supported by more than two-thirds of all the creditors,
good faith cannot be denied. 8

The court took occasion to narrow the language in the Kenmore
decision as follows:
It was not the intent of this court, in Re North Kenmore Building Corporation, supra, to fix as an arbitrary test of good faith the fact that the corporation had or had not been organized for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction. That such is the purpose does not necessarily vitiate a petition
garments for the purpose of taking advantage of the statutes appertaining thereto"; that such was not the legislative intent. In support of this last point the
court cited In re Collins, 75 F. (2d) 62 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); In re Fullagar, 8 F.
Supp. 602 (W.D.N.Y., 1934); In re Francfair, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y., 1935);
and In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 8 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.Pa., 1934), approved,
Wilson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 73 F. (2d) 1022 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1934).
7 In re Loeb Apartments, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 461 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937); Evans, Lindley,
and Briggle; opinion by Lindley, D.J.; Briggle, D.J., dissenting.
8 89 F. (2d) at p. 463.
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under section 77B, nor does it always endow such a proceeding with a
character negativing good faith. 9

The court held that Congress intended by Section 77B to provide a method for prompt reorganization, saying:
To invoke that jurisdiction and to guide one's steps with that purpose in
mind is in accord with the statute and is not opposed to good faith as that
term is used in the statute.10

The dissent by Briggle, D.J. (who wrote the opinion in the
Knickerbocker case) is grounded on the fact that the property
had been owned by an individual who, having failed for certain
reasons in an attempt under Section 74, had caused the debtor
to be formed; that the debt having been first incurred by an individual distinguishes the Knickerbocker Hotel decision. The dissenting opinion, however, rested on the lack of good faith but
goes on to say that it was not the legislative intent that individuals might create corporations to file under a statute affording
greater advantages than the one for individuals, citing in support of such view the cases relied upon in the Kenmore case.,'
CASES DENYING AMENABILITY

In the Milwaukee Postal Building case, 2 a corporation sold an
issue of bonds executed by it which was secured by a trust deed
on its garage property in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, of which issue
there were outstanding $149,500. Later it conveyed the property
to a person named Little. About four years' taxes were in default and interest was unpaid since early 1936. A bondholders'
committee was formed and 75 per cent of the bonds were deposited with it. When soliciting the deposit of bonds the committee
circulated a plan which provided that a new corporation would
be formed to be known as the Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation. The capital stock was to be held by voting trustees for
a number of years and finally to be distributed to the bondholders; the maturity dates of the old bonds were to be extended and
the interest rates were to be reduced. The plan was to be effective upon the acceptance of 95 per cent of the bonds.
To carry out the plan an escrow agreement was entered into
9 Ibid., pp. 463-4.
10 Ibid., p. 464. See In re South Coast Co., 8 F. Supp. 43 (D.Del., 1934): "Bad
faith cannot attach to adopting a course afforded by the Congress."
11 See note 6, supra.
12 Milwaukee Postal Bldg. Corp. v. McCann, 95 F. (2d) 948 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938);
Stone, Woodrough, and Van Valkenburgh; opinion by Stone, C.J.
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by the committee, Little, and a trust company as escrowee. Into
the escrow Little was to deposit $5,583.33, being the rent collections for the last two months, and a deed conveying the property to the new corporation, and the stock certificates representing the capital stock of the new corporation were to be placed in
the escrow. The cash and subsequent rent collections were to be
used, first, for committee expenses, and the balance to be paid
to the bondholders. If the plan was not accepted by 95 per cent
of the bonds by a certain date, then the stock certificates were to
be delivered to Little and the cash in the escrow to the indenture
trustee under the trust deed securing the bonds. The debtor was
organized on July 9, 1936, and began business on July 22, 1936;
the trust company collected the rents and made certain expenditures so that it had at the time of the hearing below $14,624.07.
One bondholder filed a foreclosure action on February 13, 1937,
in Wisconsin and sought the appointment of a receiver. The directors of the debtor then authorized the filing of the petition under 77B. Little executed an instrument agreeing to such procedure and waiving any interest in the capital stock of the debtor
under the escrow agreement. The petition was filed on February
23, 1937.
The court found that the bondholders showed a sincere effort
to work out a very difficult situation; that because the trustee under the mortgage had begun no action, the owner had been collecting the rents, and the property was not properly maintained
and needed repairs to such an extent that the tenant was threatening to vacate. Under this state of facts the court found further
that the corporation was not formed for the specific purpose of
taking advantage of Section 77B.
However, the court dismissed the petition, laying down two
propositions: (1) that it would be legal fraud upon creditors to
approve the petition; (2) that it would be "without the intendment of this section (77B) to construe as within the section a
corporation formed to and taking over the property of an individual debtor for the purpose of utilizing the section." The
opinion, after stating the facts, contains the following language:
It is confined to instances where the debtor is a corporation. It has
nothing to do with the situation where the debtor is an individual or a
partnership-sections 74 and 75, as amended, U.S.C.A. title 11, §§ 202 and
203, cover the field as to individuals in so far as Congress deemed it wise
so to do. It deals solely with corporate reorganizations. This being true,
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it is clear that it would be not only a legal fraud upon creditors, but without the intendment of this section to construe as within the section a
corporation formed to and taking over the property of an individual
debtor for the purpose of utilizing the section. Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287
U.S. 348, 53 S. Ct. 142, 77 L.Ed. 355, 85 A.L.R. 128; Platt v. Schmitt,
8 Cir., 87 F.(2d) 437,440; In re Collins, 8 Cir., 75 F.(2d) 62; In re North
Kenmore Building Corp., 7 Cir., 81 F.(2d) 656, and see In re Philadelphia

Rapid Transit Co., D.C. Pa., 8 F. Supp. 51, approved in Wilson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 3 Cir., 73 F. (2d) 1022, contra, In re Loeb Apart-

ments, 7 Cir., 89 F.(2d) 461. In the Platt case, supra, Judge Woodrough,
for this court, said: "There is a duty in the courts to see that provisions
of the act are not abused and that its privileges are extended only to those
who are within the contemplation of the act." 87 F.(2d) 437, at page 440.
CASES CITED AGAINST AMIENABILITY

The opinion in the Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation
case, does not mention the Knickerbocker Hotel case, but relies
upon one equity receivership case and certain bankruptcy reorganization cases. These cases may be summarized as follows:
8
Shapiro v. Wilgus"
was an equity receivership case. An apparently solvent individual failed in an attempt to obtain an extension from his creditors because two of his creditors refused.
Under the particular state law a receiver could not be appointed
for an individual. The debtor therefore organized a Delaware
corporation, conveyed all of his assets to the corporation and
took all of its capital stock. Three days later, in conjunction with
a single contract creditor, he brought suit against the Delaware
corporation in the Federal court and prayed for a receiver. The
court held that the creation of the corporation and the institution
of the receivership were not to administer the assets of the corporation legitimately for normal business purposes, but were to
interpose an obstruction to creditors, saying that the conveyance
was a mere "scheme whereby the form of a judicial remedy
was to supply a protective cover for a fraudulent design."
In the Collins case,'14 a corporation conveyed, without consideration, all of its property to Collins, who owned all the capital
stock, on February 9, and on February 12 Collins filed a Section
74 petition. Section 77B was not at this time in force. The court
found that the purpose of the entire transaction and of every
move in it was to hinder and delay creditors. Accordingly, the
court held the conveyance fraudulent with respect to corporate
debtors, and dissolved an order restraining sale of real estate to
18 287 U.S. 348, 53 S. Ct. 142, 77 L.Ed. 355, 85 A.L.R. 128 (1932).
14 In re Collins. 75 F. (2d) 62 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934).
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satisfy a default on a deed of trust covering the property. In the
Fullager case, 15 a person owning a considerable amount of real
estate deeded a farm to another who owned no other property for
the purpose of placing the grantee in a more favorable position
by permitting him to come under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy
Act.1 6 The court, after pointing out that such provision "was
passed for the benefit of bona fide farmers," said, "It seems to
the court that this petition was not filed in good faith, and that
the alleged debtor is not a bona fide farmer within the contemplation of the act."
It is to be noted that in Platt v. Schmitt,17 on the other hand,
a father made a gift of the property to his son and the son filed
a Section 7418 petition. The court approved the petition as having
been fied in good faith, resting its decision squarely on the
ground of good faith, and on that ground distinguished the Fullagar and Collins cases."9
In the Francfair case,20 a solvent Massachusetts trust conveyed property to a corporation in consideration of all of the
capital stock and the corporation's note for $345,000 and its assumption of the first mortgage. Foreclosure proceedings were
pending and a sale was advertised for April 29. The liabilities
against the property exceeded its appraised value by $135,000.
The court disapproved the petition for the reason that there was
no probability of a successful reorganization, citing as authority
Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock.2' The court went on to say further
that a petition filed on January 15 by a debtor incorporated on
January 2 for the purpose of acquiring property from a solvent
trust and the trust continuing in control of the property could not
be considered to have been filed in good faith, and cites by comparison Shapiro v. Wilgus.
15 In re Fullagar, 8 F. Supp. 602 (W.D.N.Y., 1934).
16 75 (s) (3), 11 U.S.C.A. § 203 (s) (3).
17 87 F. (2d) 437 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937).
18 11 U.S.C.A. § 202.
19 The court in Platt v. Schmitt was composed of Judges Sanborn, Woodrough,
and Booth. The court which decided the Milwaukee Postal Bldg. Corp. case in
the same circuit was composed of Judges Stone, Woodrough, and Van Valkenburgh.
20 In re Francfair, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y., 1935).
21 75 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935). The court affirmed an order dismissing as
not filed in good faith a petition under 77B, where the corporation's financial
condition was not shown, no reorganization plan was tendered, no facts were
pleaded showing that reorganization could be effected, and answer of the corporation and the intervening bondholders' protective committee alleged facts showing
that reorganization was impossible.
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The Philadelphia Rapid Transit case 22 was decided purely on
the question of good faith. The court held that a city official who
believed that a street car company should be reorganized, could
nevertheless not buy claims against the company for the purpose of filing an involuntary petition. The court held that an involuntary petition should be fied by creditors, and that one who
buys his way into court is not a creditor within the meaning of
the statute.
It is apparent that all the foregoing cases disapproved the petitions for reorganization or composition for lack of good faith in
fact and not because of legal fraud. In Shapiro v. Wilgus," for
example, although the term "legal fraud" was employed, the
Supreme Court found that the corporation was formed and the
receivership proceedings instituted to hinder and delay creditors. Such a finding in a reorganization case would prevent the
approval of a petition.
CONSIDERED IN VIEW OF THE STATUTORY PURPOSES

An equity receivership proceeding is different from a 77B or
Chapter X proceeding. The equity receivership theoretically is
to be used where the debtor is solvent, for, if it is insolvent, it
will be subject to bankruptcy, hence Congress had in mind remedies for a debtor and creditor situation that would apply more
universally and could be used for the rehabilitation of an insolvent debtor.
The Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation case and the dictum in the Kenmore case carried over in the dissenting opinion
in the Loeb Apartments case rest on the proposition that a petition of a newly formed corporation may be disapproved upon the
ground of legal fraud upon creditors and on the ground that Congress did not intend that the statute might be so used. These doctrines indicate that even if creditors and their debtors have attempted to reorganize out of court and have failed, they may not
then resort to the bankruptcy reorganization statutes.
Fraud is one of those terms that do not submit readily to deft22 In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 8 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.Pa., 1934), approved,
Wilson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 73 F. (2d) 1022 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1934). The
case was decided in the bankruptcy court by a three judge court, composed of
District Judges Dickinson, Kirkpatrick, and Welsh. The last named judge dissented.

23

287 U.S. 348, 53 S. Ct 142, 77 L.Ed. 355, 85 A.L.R. 128 (1932).
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nition. The facts of each case determine the question. Statutory
definitions of fraud do not seem to illuminate the subject. Fraud
is said to be synonymous with bad faith." Actual fraud is distinguished from constructive fraud, which is sometimes called
legal fraud. Constructive fraud may arise where there is a
breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral
guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of
its tendency "to deceive or mislead other persons, or to violate
private or public confidence, or to impair or injure the public interests."25 Likewise acts constitute legal fraud which, if generally
permitted, would be prejudicial to the public welfare or have a
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence.2 6 Every reorganization proceeding is a class action. It is
not a law suit with victory for one litigant over the other. The
bankruptcy reorganization amendments are an expression by
Congress of the underlying public policy that reorganization of
distressed enterprises should be promoted. The use of the remedies afforded by Congress in reorganization matters, where the
public interests are recognized to be more and more present, can
not well be said to be such acts as would constitute legal fraud
on the ground that, if generally permitted, it would tend "to deceive or mislead other persons, or to violate private or public
confidence, or to impair or injure the public interests."
If a 77B court finds that the proceedings are brought with intent to hinder and delay creditors, or if the result of the proceedings would be to hinder and delay creditors, the court should not
approve the petition because good faith would then be lacking.
A 77B or Chapter. X proceeding differs to some extent from an
equity receivership proceeding. A 77B or Chapter X proceeding
effectually places the assets of the debtor in a position for use by
the creditors and stockholders, if they have an interest, to accomplish an equitable distribution in a plan either by cash or securities. A 77B or Chapter X petition, particularly when support24 Stark v. Starr, Fed. Cas. No. 13,307 (1870); Hilgenberg v. Northup, 134 Ind.
92, 33 N.E. 786 (1893); State ex rel. Millice v. Petersen, 36 Ind. App. 269, 75 N.E.
602 (1905).
25 1 Story Equity Jur. (12th ed.) § 258. See also 26 C.J. 1061, and cases cited

therein.
26 "Constructive fraud" has been defined as "an act done or omitted, not with
an actual design to perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons, but
which, nevertheless, amounts to positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by
the court because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or

private confidence." Eaton, Equity (2d ed.), p. 260.
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ed by a large number of creditors of a senior class, cannot be
said to be brought for the purpose, therefore, of harassing or delaying creditors.
The statute specifically provides that a judge shall approve the
petition if it is a proper one and if he believes that it is filed
in good faith.2 ' There was no attempt made in Section 77B to define the term "good faith." The courts, however, established a
practical definition of good faith and held that if the interests of
the parties would be best served by a proceeding in the bankruptcy courts then good faith would be present.
The approval or disapproval of a petition lies in the sound discretion of the court. Good faith is an ultimate fact to be found
by the court from evidential facts. It is the conclusion to be
drawn one way or the other from the facts alleged in the petition
or elsewhere." It connotes honesty, actuality, innocence and the
absence of fraud, collusion, or deceit. The court's discretion is
exercised as the exigencies of each case demand. Variables present themselves that resist standardization. 29 The history and
background of the present litigation between the creditors and
the debtor-the results obtainable in other forums compared
with the likelihood of better results under the Federal reorganization statutes have been considered important elements in the
determination of good faith."
While the elements that make up good faith are vague and uncertain the court has been guided by practical considerations so
that where it is apparent that no plan can be worked out and
that it would be futile to bring the proceedings, good faith is held
27 77B, a: "Upon the filing of such a petition or answer the judge shall enter
an order either approving it as properly filed under this section if satisfied that
such petition or answer complies with this section and has been filed in good
faith, or dismissing it."
Ch. 10, § 141: "Upon the filing of a petition by a debtor, the judge shall enter
an order approving the petition, if satisfied that it complies with the requirements
of this chapter and has been filed in good faith, or dismissing it if not so satisfied."
11 U.S.C.A. § 541.
28 Hickey v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 96 F. (2d) 748 (1938).
29 The language of Platt v. Schmitt, 87 F. (2d) 437 at 440 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937) is
typical: "No comprehensive definition of 'good faith' should be attempted, but
the circumstances of each case must control according to long-settled principles
of law and equity. The purpose and spirit of the act are to be found In the
circumstances of its enactment and in all its terms considered together."
30 R. L. Witters Associates, Inc. v. Ebsary Gypsum Co., Inc., 93 F. (2d) 740
(C.C.A. 5th, 1938); In re Prairie Avenue Building Corp., 11 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.IU.,
1935); In re Loeb Apartments, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 461 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937); In re A. C.
Hotel Co., 93 F. (2d) 841 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
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to be not present. A possibility of reorganization should exist.8 1
Some prospect must be shown that the affairs of the debtor may
be reorganized-a general showing of circumstances that reasonably indicate the desirability and possibility of reorganiza32
tion.
Such practical considerations have led to the approval of petitions where it is apparent that the plan of reorganization must
result in a liquidation, that is, where the senior class of creditors
takes all of the property of the debtor.3 8
There are further statutory safeguards against harassing or
delaying creditors in that the plan must be presented in good
faith3 4 and the acceptances thereto must be obtained without the
giving of any promises forbidden by the Act and all charges and
expenses in connection with the reorganization must be disclosed
and approved by the court. 5 A showing is required of the claims
or stock purchased or transferred by those accepting the plan in
contemplation of the proceedings." Furthermore, good faith
must continue throughout the proceedings," and is required of
all concerned, including creditors and stockholders, as well as the
debtor. 8
The Supreme Court has held that the formation of a corporation to create diversity of citizenship so that the rights of the parties might be determined by a Federal Court is not improper or
collusive within the meaning of Section 37 of the Judicial Code,
which requires dismissal of a suit where the parties have improperly or collusively joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants
for the purpose of creating a case cognizable in such a court. If
the succession and transfer to the new corporation are actual,
31 In re South Coast Co., 8 F. Supp. 43 (D.Del., 1934); In re Francfair, Inc., 13
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y., 1935); R. L. Witters Associates, Inc. v. Ebsary Gypsum
Co., Inc., 93 F. (2d) 746 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
32 In re 2747 Milwaukee Avenue Building Corp., 12 F. Supp. 557 (N.D.Ill.E.D.,
1935); Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).
33 In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); R. L. Witters
Associates, Inc. v. Ebsary Gypsum Co., Inc., 93 F. (2d) 746 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938);
In re A. C. Hotel Co., 93 F. (2d) 841 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937); Re 620 Church Street
Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 57 S.Ct. 88, 81 L.Ed. 16, reh. den. 299 U.S. 623, 57 S.Ct.
229, 81 L.Ed. 458 (1936).
34 Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American National Bank, 299 U.S. 18, 57 S.Ct. 85,
81 L.Ed. 13 (1936).
35 Section 77B(f); Ch. 10, § 221.
36 Section 77B(e); Ch. 10, § 203.
37 In re Dutch Woodcraft Shops, 14 F. Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.S.D., 1935).
38 In re Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 20 F. Supp. 580 (W.D.La., Shreveport D.
1937).
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and not feigned or merely colorable, the courts will not inquire
into the motives in deciding jurisdiction. 9 In the Milwaukee
Postal Building Corporation case, the court stated that since Sections 74 and 75 were passed to cover cases where the debtor is
an individual and that Section 77B deals solely with corporations,
so therefore, it was not the intent of Congress that Section 77B
should be construed to apply to a corporation formed to take over
property of an individual debtor for the purpose of utilizing the
section. The restriction was extended to exclude a debtor not organized specifically to file under Section 77B if it was organized
and the property conveyed to it for the purpose of attempting to
work out a reorganization, because "the natural and inevitable
result thereof would be a reorganization under the section if the
out of court reorganization failed. This situation is within the
spirit of the above decisions." It further stated that to construe
the statute so as to permit relief under such circumstances would
open the door to easy evasion either intentionally or unintentionally. It is difficult to understand just what evasion would be made
possible by the approval of the petition and the opinion does not
throw any light on this speculation. The proceedings at all times
are in the control of the -court of equity for a new purpose-that
of reorganization-and improper evasion would not be permitted.
There is nothing in Section 77B that limits its application to
corporations in existence at the date of its passage.4 0 Section 77B
expressly applies to any corporation that could become a bankrupt, except one amenable to Section 77.
The limitations in section 77B with respect to venue, do not relate to the period of time of corporate existence. 4' This is made
clearer by the comparable provisions of Chapter X, by the addition of the language "or for a longer portion of the preceding
six months than in any other jurisdiction.''
89 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928).
40 In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., 81 F. (2d) 981 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
41 Section 77B(a). "The petition shall be filed with the court in whose territorial
jurisdiction the corporation, during the preceding six months or the greater
portion thereof, has had its principal place of business or its principal assets, or
in any territorial jurisdiction in the State in which it was incorporated."
42 Ch. 10, § 128. "If no bankruptcy proceeding is pending, an original petition
may be filed with the court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation has
had its principal place of business or its principal assets for the preceding six
months or for a longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other
jurisdiction."
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If the rule laid down by the Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation case is followed, attempts at out-of-court reorganization will be discouraged where it is necessary to form a corporation to carry out the reorganization because, should such attempts fail, the corporation could not complete its reorganization in a court proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act for lack of
amenability to the reorganization chapters thereof.
The general purpose of the legislation is expressed in 77A. It
has been said that the extent of jurisdiction is significant and distinguishes cases under the old Act. 43 It has been said that it has
as one of its purposes the creation of a method whereby dehydration of securities may be effected, and gradual deflation from
excessive inflation be had, and by orderly processes, to accomplish a reorganization of the financial and economic structure to
reach recovery." Though such proceedings are in bankruptcy,4 5
they differ fundamentally from ordinary bankruptcy. 6 Such
proceedings are not the same as proceedings in equity receivership as to form, practice, or objectives. The reorganization
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act authorize the courts to do
47
what they have not been able to do in equity receivership.
The courts have held that the bankruptcy amendments should
be liberally construed so far as possible to make the legislation
43 "Likewise, legislation which deals with the subject of bankruptcy, that is,
legislation for the benefit and relief of creditors and debtors-is not subject to the
same constitutional limitations as legislation which deals with other subjects and
which affects contractual rights and obligations of debtors and creditors. The
grant of power 'to establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies'
(Const. art. 1, § 8, subd. 4) was necessarily a grant of power the exercise of
which would impair the obligation of contracts. For legislation on the subject of
bankruptcy contemplates a discharge of the debtor's debts-which is an impairment of contractual obligations. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S.
181, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 L.Ed. 1113." In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 72 F.(2d)
443, 452 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934).
44 Campbell v. Alleghany Corporation, 75 F. (2d) 947, 951 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935).
45 Meyer v. Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 297 U.S. 160, 56 S. Ct. 405, 80 L.Ed.
557 (1936); Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 456, 57 S. Ct. 303, 81 L.Ed. 348
(1937).
46 Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 56 S. Ct.
696, 80 L.Ed. 1114 (1936); Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648 55 S. Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935).
47 "The proceedings under sections 74, 75, 76, and 77 are not the equivalents of
equity receivership proceedings. They contemplate a feasible plan, promptly presented, whereby the overburdened debtor may, through creditors' co-operation
(though unanimous creditor action is unnecessary) secure a scaling of debt or
interest, or an extension of due date of debts." [Italics by the court] In re
Sterba, 74 F. (2d) 413. 417 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
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effective.4 8 The purpose of the statute should be forwarded by a
fair and liberal construction of its provisions and not thwarted by
a narrow and technical interpretation "and certainly not by
reading into its language conditions and limitations which the
law makers did not see fit to express. 4 The meaning of words
and phrases used in equity cases has been broadened to meet the
requirements of the reorganization statutes and to carry out the
intent and purposes of such statutes, particularly to overcome
the emphasis placed by courts of equity on the position of nonassenting minorities.5" It is difficult enough for creditors to
realize on their claims at best, and especially so when they must
act in a class."1
It is therefore manifestly unfair to creditors to bar them from
the newly created remedies of the Bankruptcy Act unless Congress has clearly shut the door to them. Likewise, stockholders
are entitled to the fullest use of these remedies to salvage their
investments. If the bankruptcy forum is indicated as the best one
for readjustment of the claims and stock interests such forum
should not be denied by strained legalism which may also tend
to place the legislation in a "strait-jacket." This the Supreme
Court said should not be done.2 General congressional intent is
thus recognized and adherence to inappropriate concepts with
48 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 57 S. Ct. 292,
81 L.Ed. 324 (1937); In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 72 F. (2d) 443 (C.C.A. 7th,
1934), aff'd, Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
294 U.S. 648, 55 S. Ct. 595, 79 L. Ed. 1110 (1935).
49 Campbell v. Alleghany Corporation, 75 F (2d) 947, 950 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935).
50 In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.Pa., 1936). See also: Downtown Inv. Association v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs. Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314 (C.C.A.
1st, 1936); Ashton v. Cameron County W.I. Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S. Ct.
892; 80 L.Ed. 1309 (1936); In re Allied Owners' Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C.C.A. 2d,
1934).
51 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 79
L.Ed. 1593 (1935), cited in the Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation case in
support of the statement that prior to Section 77B there were only two remedies
open to debtors and creditors, viz: liquidation or bargaining for composition. In
the Louisville case, the court clearly indicated the difference between class action
in reorganization and individual action: "In no case of composition is a secured
claim affected except when the holder is a member of a class; and then only
when the composition is desired by the requisite majority and is approved by the
court. Never, so far as appears, has any composition affected a secured claim
held by a single creditor."
52 Lowden v. Northwestern Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 56 S. Ct. 696,
80 L. Ed. 1114 (1936). In discussing the applicability or inapplicability of the setoff rule, the court said: "A decision balancing the equities must await the exposure of a concrete situation with all its qualifying incidents. What we disclaim
at the moment is a willingness to put the law into a strait-jacket by subjecting it
to a pronouncement of needless generality."
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the development of unworkable precepts is to be avoided. The
concept of legal fraud has no place in the administration of a law
where fact controls.
If it is not in harmony with the congressional intent and purpose to deny the facilities of the bankruptcy reorganization statutes to any corporation otherwise qualified if it is in need of reorganization and if the interest of creditors and stockholders, if
they have an equity, may be thereby better conserved. In this
field of reorganization actuality is the important thing. Potency
of fact surmounts authority of theory. In deciding whether 77B
petitions for reorganization should or should not be approved, it
is improper to resurrect such fiction as legal fraud when interpreting a statute which specifically requires good faith in the
presentation of the petition.
EFFECT OF CHAPTER X

The Revised Bankruptcy Act of 1938, including Chapters X and
XII, containing reorganization provisions derived principally
from Sections 77B and 74, strengthens not only the liquidation
provisions in bankruptcy but the reorganization provisions as
well. Chapter XII, dealing with arrangements by persons other
than corporations, provides that the plan shall modify or alter
the rights of secured creditors either through the issuance of securities or otherwise.5 3 The reorganization of the affairs of an
individual debtor, therefore, is not more limited in this respect
than that of a corporation under Chapter X or Section 77B. Such
reorganization may be by the transfer of its securities to a corporation and issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise.
The provisions of Chapter X respecting the required allegations in a petition have been amplified over those required in Section 77B in that it is specifically provided that a showing of facts
must be made concerning the status of any plan of reorganization, readjustment, or liquidation affecting the property of the
corporation either in connection with or without any judicial proceeding. 4 This would indicate that should the court find from
53 Section 461: "An arrangement-(1) shall include provisions modifying or
altering the rights of creditors who hold debts secured by real property or a
chattel real of the debtor, generally or of a class of them, either through the
issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise. ... ." 11 U.S.C.A. § 861.
54 Section 130: "Every petition shall state . . . (6) the status of any plan of
reorganization, readjustment, or liquidation affecting the property of the corporation, pending either in connection with or without any judicial proceeding.
." 11 U.S.C.A. § 530.
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the exposition of facts showing that an out of court reorganization has been attempted through the mechanics of a new corporation, as in the Milwaukee Postal Building Corporation case, the
petition should be approved if the court believes that to do so
would best subserve the interests of the parties.
While no attempt is made in Chapter X to define the term
"good faith," Section 146 sets forth certain conditions which if
present would negative good faith. 55 This substantially codifies
certain decisions under 77B. 56 Furthermore, it is expressly provided that if there is a prior proceeding in any court and it appears that the interests of stockholders and creditors would best
be served in the prior proceeding, good faith is not present. Conversely, it would follow that, notwithstanding attempts at reorganization in other proceedings, if the court believes that the interests of the creditors and stockholders would be best served
under Chapter X, good faith will be present and the petition, if
otherwise proper, should be approved.
The provision of 77B 57 granting jurisdiction in the reorganization court over property of the debtor held by a receiver or trustee appointed in any other court has been strengthened in Chapter X 58 by the provision that the trustee appointed under the
Act shall have the right to immediate possession of the debtor's
property which is in possession of a trustee or mortgagee under
a mortgage. This provision is undoubtedly inserted to overcome
the effect of certain decisions under 77B relating to property in
55 Section 146: "Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the term
'good faith,' a petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if(1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of
filing the petition; or
(2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition under the provisions of chapter XI of this title; or
(3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected; or
(4) a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests
of creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding."
11 U.S.C.A. § 546.
56 See cases cited in notes 20, and 27 to 30 inclusive.
57 77B(i): "and if such petition or answer is approved, the trustee or trustees
appointed under this section, or the debtor if no trustee is appointed, shall be
"
entitled forthwith to possession of and vested with title to such property ....
58 Section 257: "The trustee appointed under this chapter, upon his qualification, or if a debtor is continued in possession, the debtor, shall become vested
with the rights, if any, of such prior receiver or trustee in such property and
with the right to the immediate possession thereof. . . . [and] of all property of
the debtor in the possession of a trustee under a trust deed or a mortgagee under
a mortgage." 11 U.S.C.A. § 657.
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states following the "title" theory instead of the "lien" theory
as to the rights of mortgagees after default.59
CONCLUSION

If the judge finds that a petition is filed in good faith, such finding is tantamount to a finding that the proceeding would not embarrass or obstruct creditors in the pursuit of their legitimate
remedies. The finding of good faith, therefore, and orders based
thereon preclude the existence of legal fraud. To afford the remedy under an order of approval after such finding of fact cannot
be said to hinder and delay creditors. No legal fraud is perpetrated on creditors by the approval of a petition properly
drawn and presented if the judge finds, in the exercise of sound
discretion, that the petition is filed in good faith under the practical and comprehensive definition of that term as found in the
opinions of the cases.
It is within the "intendment" of the legislation, as shown by its
express language and by the construction placed thereon by the
courts generally, to hold that a corporation formed as a step in
the process of reorganization is amenable to the provisions of
Section 77B and Chapter X.
59 See, for example, In re Frances E. Willard National Temperance Hospital,
82 F. (2d) 804 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936), in which the court quoted the following language
from Tuttle v. Harris, 297 U.S. 225, 56 S.Ct. 416, 80 L. Ed. 654 (1936): "A mortgagee
after condition broken under the law of Illinois is the owner of a legal estate,
and as such entitled as of right to the possession of the mortgaged premises.
Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306, 189 N.E. 312. The grantee under the deed of
trust was in possession not as receiver, but as owner," and then held: "It
follows from this that as owner, he cannot be ousted under proceedings under
section 77B, and it was therefore error for the court to order the mortgaged
property turned over to the temporary trustee, either by summary or plenary
proceedings."

